The dramatic government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September, 2008 was motivated in part by a desire to ensure adequate liquidity in the mortgage market. This study examines a closely related issue: the extent to which GSE activity crowds out mortgage purchases by private secondary market intermediaries. Evidence of substantial crowd out suggests that government support for the GSEs may be less warranted, while absence of crowd out implies that the GSEs enhance liquidity.
I.

Introduction
Over the course of recent decades, the U.S. government has provided extensive support for the secondary mortgage market, notably through its longstanding implicit guarantee of debt issued by the federally chartered GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. While controversial, that guarantee nevertheless became more explicit in September, 2008 with the dramatic government takeover of Fannie and Freddie, motivated in part by a desire to assure adequate liquidity in the mortgage market. This study examines the extent to which the GSEs have been net providers of liquidity in residential mortgage markets. Specifically, it evaluates whether GSE loan purchase activity in the secondary market crowds out loan purchases by private secondary market intermediaries. High levels of crowd out suggest that government support for the GSEs may be less warranted, whereas the absence of crowd out implies that GSE purchases enhance market liquidity and, in that respect, play an essential role in the provision of mortgage finance.
2 This is especially important in the context of the current financial crisis and related freezing up of credit markets. Some further background is in order.
The GSEs were established with the primary goal of facilitating development of an active secondary mortgage market that would provide retail lenders with an expansive and reliable source of funds. Lenders in the primary market sell loans to investors in the secondary market who either hold those loans in portfolio or securitize and sell shares of loan pools to investors worldwide. The 1 See Jaffee (2006) and Glaeser and Jaffee (2006) for recent discussions of concerns about the federal government's implicit backing of the GSEs.
2 A number of recent studies have addressed various facets of the ongoing financial crisis and the role that has been played by mortgage markets. DiMartino and Duca (2008) document the dramatic rise in subprime lending and subsequent crash in housing and mortgage activity. Foote, Gerardi and Willen (2008) examine the frequency and timing of mortgage default, and argue that default rates are likely to remain elevated until house prices regain their former peaks. Bucks and Pence (2008) report evidence that many ARM borrowers do not have adequate information on the terms of their loans, and their exposure to interest rate risk. Sufi and Mian (2008) show that during the 2002-2005 period, expansion of mortgage credit to high-risk ("subprime") neighborhoods was closely tied to the increasing securitization of subprime loans. Mayer and Pence (2007) examine the spatial distribution of subprime lending. They report evidence that subprime lending in 2005 was concentrated in lower income and minority communities, as well as in fast growing areas that were experiencing sharp increases in house prices and housing starts. Green and Wachter (2005) offer an historical perspective that helps to put the current system of mortgage finance in context. While these and other prior studies add greatly to our understanding of the current system of mortgage finance and the ongoing financial crisis, none to our knowledge consider the central question raised here: the extent to which loan purchases by the GSEs crowd out private sector purchases, and related implications for the recent federal rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
secondary market frees loan originators from reliance on local deposits as their primary source of funds, and as a consequence, has been shown to enhance access to mortgage credit (e.g. Pennacchi (1988) , Carlstrom and Samolyk (1995) , Drucker and Puri (2008) , and Gabriel and Rosenthal (2007) ). 3 Federal government support of the GSEs has been closely linked to GSE adherence to policy goals embodied in their charters. Under terms of the 1992 Federal Housing Enterprise Financial
Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (GSE Act of 1992), the GSEs were required to devote a large share of their loan purchases to low-income families and/or individuals residing in low-income and/or minority communities. The Act further mandated that specific affordable housing purchase goals be established by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Over time, HUD ratcheted up the GSE purchase targets: at the time of government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008, over 50 percent of loans purchased by the GSEs must have been issued to "lowmoderate" income borrowers, and nearly 40 percent of loans must have been purchased from "underserved" census tracts. 4 Evidence from previous studies suggests that the GSEs have largely honored their loan purchase targets (e.g. Bunce and Scheessele (1996) , Bunce (2002) ).
In exchange for GSE adherence to federal policy goals, there has been a longstanding implicit understanding among the government, the GSEs, and GSE debt investors that the U.S. Government would stand behind the debt of those entities. Although the federal government was not legally bound to come to Fannie and Freddie's recent rescue, a failure to do so could have been interpreted by market participants as a default on securities backed by the U.S. Government, with possible far-reaching and 3 Secondary credit markets improve access to credit in several ways. They increase liquidity for primary lenders, smooth regional imbalances in the supply and demand for credit, and enhance opportunities to manage risk. These gains stem from economies of scale associated with the large size of the secondary market. Early theoretical work on secondary credit markets by Pennacchi (1988) and Carlstrom and Samolyk (1995) argued that factors including lender comparative advantage in loan origination and risk diversification should result in increased loan sales. Drucker and Puri (2008) document an empirical relationship between bank loan sales and increased borrowing by businesses. Gabriel and Rosenthal (2007) find a similar relationship for the mortgage market.
adverse implications for the cost of credit to the United States. 5 Further, the sheer size of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac presented an untenable risk to U.S. mortgage markets and by extension to the larger macro economy should these companies have become insolvent and been allowed to fail. As of 2007, securitized home mortgage debt backed by the GSEs totaled $4.0 trillion. This was close to the outstanding level of U.S. Treasury debt, almost double that of outstanding consumer debt, and roughly two-thirds the value of all outstanding household pension reserves. 6 Given this background, it is imperative to better understand the potential impact of the GSEs on the supply of mortgage credit.
As a starting point, it is illuminating to further characterize the relative size of GSE and non-GSE loan purchases in an evolving secondary mortgage market. We do this by examining the ratio of secondary market loan purchases relative to loan originations, both for the market overall, and also for GSE and non-GSE purchases separately. These ratios are calculated for each even year from 1994 through 2000, and annually from 2001 through 2007. Moreover, in light of the 1992 GSE Act focus on lower income communities, we calculate purchase/origination ratios separately for different groups of census tracts based on the degree to which tract median income is below or above 90 percent of MSA median income (AMI), the income limit used by HUD and Congress to define an underserved tract. In all cases, our analysis is based on data for conventional home purchase mortgage loans obtained through the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). We also restrict our attention to those loans that are below the conforming loan size limit set by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). Our focus is consistent with the GSE mandate to enhance liquidity in the secondary market for conventional "conforming" loans.
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Figure 1 displays plots of the purchase/origination ratios by neighborhood income status.
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Separate panels are provided for each sample year and illuminate several stark patterns. First, over time, the share of originations purchased by entities in the secondary market -as approximated by the ratio of purchases to originations -has increased. In 1994, roughly 50 to 60 percent of originations were purchased by secondary market institutions, with higher purchase rates occurring in the higherincome communities. Purchase rates increased monotonically over time, reaching roughly 100 percent in 2004 for all neighborhoods regardless of income status. Purchase rates remained at these very high levels through 2007. Overall, this pattern documents the well known rise of the secondary market in the 1990s as the primary source of funds for mortgage finance. Today, nearly all capital used to finance conforming sized home purchase loans comes from the secondary market, a dramatic change from just fifteen years ago.
A second pattern in Figure 1 The primary underwriting criteria used to define conventional conforming loans is the maximum allowable loan size that governs purchases by the GSEs as set by OFHEO. Although debt-to-income ratios and documentation requirements may also play a role, this has not always characterized the purchase behavior of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, especially in the 2004-2006 period. In the HMDA data we are able to observe loan size which permits us to group loans into those below versus above the loan size limit. HMDA does not provide information on payment-to-income ratios or the degree of borrower documentation. These patterns are echoed in Table 1 On the surface, the patterns in Figure 1 and Table 1 are suggestive that GSE loan purchase activity does much to enhance liquidity in the mortgage market. While this may be true, such a conclusion may be premature. Later in the paper, we show that as secondary market loan supply becomes less elastic, GSE crowd out of non-GSE loan purchases becomes more pronounced. We further argue that when primary market institutions hold few loans in portfolio, as evidenced from 2004 onwards, they can only supply additional loans to the secondary market by originating more mortgages. This likely would cause the secondary market loan supply function to become less elastic, increasing the degree of crowd out by the GSEs. On the other hand, the dramatic contraction of non- 9 The rapid growth in originations in recent years has coincided with the surge in popularity of new mortgage designs, including interest-only, payment option, sub-prime and related instruments.
GSE demand for loans in 2007 could have moved the secondary market back to a more elastic portion of the loan supply function. This would tend to reduce GSE crowd out. Our simple model, therefore, predicts that the extent of GSE crowd out likely depends on market conditions and varies over time.
To assess the crowd out effects of GSE loan purchases, we regress private sector purchase/origination ratios on GSE purchase/origination ratios. Our unit of observation is the census tract, and we restrict our attention to conventional home purchase loans conforming to GSE loan size limitations, and also to tracts located within MSAs in 2000 (as in Figure 1 and Table 1 ). Evidence of a negative coefficient on GSE purchase/origination shares suggests that GSE purchases crowd out loan purchases by private secondary market entities; evidence of a -1 coefficient would be consistent with full crowd out.
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Central to our empirical analysis is the need to control for the likely endogenous character of GSE purchase/origination ratios. If unobserved tract attributes provide profitable loan purchase opportunities for both the GSEs and non-GSEs, this would suggest that GSE purchase/origination ratios would be positively correlated with an ordinary least squares (OLS) error term. This would cause the OLS coefficient on GSE activity to be biased upwards towards a less negative value. If instead, possibly because of distributional goals associated with their government charters, the GSEs seek to purchase loans in census tracts that differ systematically from those associated with private sector purchases, a negative OLS bias could result and this would cause the OLS estimates to overstate crowd out effects. Although we cannot sign the OLS bias a priori, it seems likely that GSE purchase/origination ratios are endogenous.
To address this concern, we instrument for GSE purchase/origination ratios using instruments motivated by the federal guidelines that regulate GSE purchase activity. First, we argue that absent 10 In principle, agglomeration economies arising from the presence of the GSEs could enhance opportunities for private sector entities to purchase loans (e.g. Rosenthal and Strange (2004) ). This might occur if GSE activity helped to establish information networks and other infrastructure necessary to support the entire market (e.g. Lang and Nakamura (1994)). Harrison et al (2002) suggest that Fannie Mae purchases have had such an effect in parts of Florida. In practice, however, evidence presented later in the paper suggests that crowd out -which implies that GSE purchases reduce private sector activity -dominates, and especially in recent years. the number and type of loans originated. We then instrument for GSE loan purchase-to-origination ratios using the census tract's underserved status and the tract's ratio of median borrower income to AMI.
It should be emphasized that conditional on GSE purchase activity and the other model controls, there is no particular reason why the relative economic status of the tract and borrower pool should appear in the second stage equation used to explain private sector purchase/origination ratios.
11 HUD guidelines set three specific purchase goals to which the GSEs must adhere: the "low-moderate income" goal, the "special affordable" goal, and the "geographically targeted" or "underserved areas" goal. For the lowmoderate income goal, lower-income borrowers are defined as individuals with income below that of MSA (metropolitan statistical area) median income. For the special affordable goal, very low income borrowers are those with income less than 60 percent of the area median income. The special affordable goal also includes borrowers with income less than 80 percent of the area median income who reside in census tracts defined as low-income (tracts with median income less than 90 percent of MSA median income). Under the geographically targeted goal, low-income, underserved neighborhoods are defined as census tracts with median income less than 90 percent of MSA median income or tracts with over 30% minority population and median income less than 120% of area median income. For 2008, the low-moderate income goal is 52 to 56 percent of total GSE purchases, the geographically targeted goal is 37 to 39 percent of GSE purchases, and the special affordable goal is 22 to 27 percent of GSE purchases (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2004)). These categories are not mutually exclusive, so a single loan purchase can count towards multiple goals.
In most instances, for example, it is unlikely that private sector secondary market purchasers even know the tract from which purchased loans are drawn, or the attributes of the underlying borrowers.
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The GSE Act, however, mandates that the GSEs explicitly pay attention to these features. This further suggests that our instruments should be strongly correlated with GSE purchase activity, and that is confirmed empirically later in the paper. For these reasons, we feel that a compelling case can be made for the exogeneity of the instruments, and that weak instrument bias is not a problem (e.g.
Murray (2006) To clarify these results, the plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides additional background on the GSEs and related regulation. Section 3 presents a simple conceptual model of GSE crowd out of private sector loan purchases. Section 4 develops the empirical model. Section 5 presents data and summary statistics. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes.
II. Background
As noted earlier, the GSEs are required to secure a minimum share of their annual loan purchases from targeted communities and groups. Bunce and Scheessele (1996) , Bunce (2002) , and others provide evidence that in the years following enactment of the 1992 GSE Act, the GSEs increased the proportion of loan purchases from targeted populations. A different set of studies have sought to identify the impact of GSE purchase targets on mortgage loan originations. While not directly addressing the possibility that GSE activity may crowd out private sector loan purchases, evidence that the GSE purchase targets increase originations in underserved census tracts would be suggestive of less than full crowd out. 14 Bearing that in mind, Ambrose and Thibodeau (2004) use data from the latter half of the 1990s to analyze the impact of the percentage of an MSA's census tracts defined by the 1992 GSE Act as underserved on MSA-level mortgage originations (including purchase and refinance loans that do and do not conform to GSE underwriting requirements). Ambrose and Thibodeau (2004) conclude that between 1995 and 1999, only in 1998 did GSE activity increase originations. An and Bostic (1996, forthcoming) restrict their attention to census tracts in 1996 and 2000 just below and just above 90 percent of an MSA's median income, the cutoff used to define underserved tracts for purposes of the GSE purchase targets. An and Bostic conclude that GSE purchases reduce subprime and FHA originations in underserved tracts close to the target cutoff. Although all three of these papers are suggestive of less than full GSE crowd out of private sector activity, none of these papers actually consider crowd out directly or offer any guidance as to the possible extent of the phenomenon. Moreover, the sample and econometric design used in each of these papers precludes such an attempt.
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To our knowledge, no previous studies of the mortgage market have directly considered the crowd out effects associated with GSE operations. This is in contrast to other markets in which public sector crowd out of private sector activity has been carefully studied. This includes previous experimental research on crowd out associated with the provision of public goods (Andreoni (1993) ),
as well as studies that examine crowd out from publicly provided health insurance (Culter and Gruber (1996), Brown and Finkelstein (2004) , Brown, Coe, and Finkelstein (2006) , and Gruber and Simon (2007)), and public construction of low-and moderate-income housing (Murray (1982 (Murray ( , 1999 , Sinai and Waldfogel (2005), and Eriksen and Rosenthal (2007) . A common theme across all of these studies is that public sector crowd out of private activity can be substantial, especially when a viable private sector alternative is present. Consider the following examples.
Gruber and Simon (2007) estimate that 60 percent of the expansion in public health insurance during the 1996-2002 period was offset by crowd out of private market insurance. 16 Sinai and
Waldfogel (2005) and Eriksen and Rosenthal (2008) both find high rates of crowd out rates associated 15 An and Bostic (2006) treat GSE and FHA purchases as exogenous when estimating the impact of changes in GSE and FHA purchase shares on changes in subprime loan origination shares between 1996 and 2000. This is problematic because originations affect supply on the secondary market and have a direct impact on GSE and other secondary market activity. In addition, FHA and subprime originations respond to common unobserved attributes causing FHA activity to be endogneous. An and Bostic (forthcoming) instrument for GSE purchases using census tract underserved status and homeownership rate, along with other local neighborhood and MSA-level control measures. This is also problematic because tract income is omitted from the model specification even though tract income affects mortgage demand and underserved tract status. This implies that underserved status in their specification is not excludable. In addition, homeownership is sensitive to access to mortgage credit and is likely correlated with the model error term. Ambrose and Thibodeau (2004) adopt a switching regression model based on Fair and Jaffee (1972) in which they treat the switching mechanism as exogenous. Increases in MSA-level mortgage rates are treated as indicative of excess demand and as a signal that the local market is on the supply curve. Stratifying their sample on this basis, Ambrose and Thibodeau estimate the supply of loan originations including controls for the share of census tracts in an MSA that meet underserved status. Results from this approach are sensitive to the veracity of the sample stratification scheme.
with publicly subsidized construction of low-and moderate income housing. 17 Given evidence of substantial crowd out in these studies, it is plausible that similarly large crowd out effects could arise from government sponsored GSE loan purchases in the secondary mortgage market. The extent to which such crowd out occurs and its implications for GSE provision of liquidity is considered in the remaining sections of this paper, both on conceptual and empirical grounds.
III. Conceptual Model
This section outlines a simple model that clarifies market conditions under which GSE loan purchases are likely to crowd out purchases by private entities in the secondary market. As drawn in Figure 2 , we assume that the secondary market loan supply function is initially relatively elastic as higher purchase prices induce lenders in the primary market to supply additional loans to the secondary market. The increase in supply is made possible not only because lenders originate more loans, but also because they may sell a greater share of loans held in portfolio. We further assume that the loan supply function becomes more inelastic as loan supply increases. This reflects the presumption that lenders in the primary market find it increasingly difficult and costly to originate more loans and/or to sell off their remaining loans held in portfolio.
Suppose now that secondary market loan demand intersects the relatively elastic portion of the supply function. As demand shifts out in response to government subsidization of GSE purchases, a modest increase in price induces primary lenders to supply additional loans to the secondary market.
18
Under these conditions, GSE crowd out of private sector loan purchases occurs, but is quite limited.
Suppose instead that secondary market loan demand intersects loan supply in its more inelastic portion. Here also, government prompted GSE purchases push the loan demand function up the supply curve. The price of loans traded on the secondary market rises to clear the market, but the number of loans sold on the secondary market increases by only a small amount. In this instance, GSE crowd out of private secondary market loan purchases is more pronounced.
These two scenarios highlight core principles that are relevant to the timeframe of our empirical analysis: (i) crowd out arising from GSE purchases increases as the secondary market supply of loans becomes more inelastic, and (ii) crowd out is reduced when demand shifts back to a more elastic portion of the supply curve.
IV. Empirical Model
Specification
As discussed above, the supply of GSE-conforming loans in the secondary market is directly related to primary market originations and to the number of loans held in portfolio by lenders in the primary market. Bearing that in mind, the number of loans originated by primary lenders in period t (L t ) equal applications (A t ) minus denials (D t ),
Applications approximate demand and depend on mortgage rates (r t ) and the attributes of the applicant
The number of applications denied also depends on r t and Z t where in this case, Z proxies for applicant credit risk. Gabriel and Rosenthal (2007) provide evidence that a more active secondary market reduces the share of applications that are denied. This occurs because active secondary markets manage risk more efficiently and provide opportunities for loan originators to shift risk to that sector. We denote the level share of applications that are originated by an amount roughly comparable to the prevailing loan denial rate, about 15 percent of applications.
of secondary market purchases as P t . If GSE loan purchases are not fully offset by crowd out of private sector activity, then P t is sensitive to GSE activity, or P t = ( ) 
( 4.4) This says that the number of loans originated depends on market mortgage rates, the level of secondary market activity, and attributes of the potential pool of applicants. Of these loans, a fraction (θ t ) are held in portfolio by primary lenders, while the remaining portion, 1-θ is sold on the secondary market.
Portfolio lending, of course, has declined dramatically in recent years as discussed in the Introduction. Nevertheless, depository institutions typically still hold at least some of their originations in portfolio and that affects supply in the secondary market. It is sufficient here to note that in any given year, θ depends on loan applicant attributes, Z, and market interest rates, r. Accordingly, supply in the secondary market is given by,
where the inequality is provided as a reminder that primary lenders can sell loans only up to the number originated.
Demand for loans in the secondary market is sensitive to interest rates, conditions in global capital markets (Ω t ), government policy that affects GSE purchases, and attributes of the loan applicant pool, 
Identification
An important feature of (4.9) is that , GSE t i P may be endogenous. This is for two reasons. The first is that unobserved factors that affect originations also directly affect the supply of loans in the secondary market. That in turn causes GSE loan purchases to be correlated with the model error term. As a first step in addressing this issue, we normalize private and GSE loan purchases by the number of loans originated in a given tract and period. The estimating equation becomes, 19 For that reason, in the discussion to follow, we do not focus on those terms. , , ,
,
Adjusting private and GSE purchases in this fashion differences away the influence of unobserved factors that have a common effect on originations and secondary market loan purchases.
Correlation between the GSE purchase-to-origination ratio and the model error term could remain, however. This is because additional unobserved factors may affect both the share of originations that primary lenders hold in portfolio (θ) as well as secondary market purchases. This could also cause , , / GSE t i t i P L to be correlated with the model error term resulting in biased estimates of GSE crowd out effects.
To allow for this second source of correlation we instrument for GSE purchases using the underserved status of the census tracts and tract median borrower income relative to AMI as discussed in the Introduction. As also discussed in the Introduction, the model further controls for tract loan and borrower attributes, as well as a long list of tract socioeconomic attributes. These are the Z attributes in (4.10) and serve to control for the underlying demand for mortgage debt and the credit attributes of the local population that affect the number of loan originations in a given tract. In the presence of these controls, there is no natural role in the estimating model for the relative economic status of the tract and borrower pool as discussed in the Introduction. As will also become apparent, our instruments are strongly correlated with the GSE purchase/origination ratio. We discuss the properties of our instruments including diagnostic tests in detail later in the paper.
V. Data and Summary Measures
Data for the analysis were obtained from the Home Mortgage and Disclosure Act (HMDA) and the decennial Census. Specifically, we drew upon the HMDA data files for every even year from To further clean the data, certain observations were dropped. In calculating tract-level mortgage attributes (e.g. purchases, originations), individual loan records from the HMDA data were dropped if the type or purpose of the loan could not be determined. As also noted earlier, we focus 20 As is well known, HMDA data do not provide information on individual loan applicant wealth or credit score (credit history). However, as described earlier, our focus on secondary market behavior largely mitigates this limitation in the data because secondary market purchases are based on broad features of the pooled mortgages rather than on the characteristics of specific borrowers.
only on conventional, home purchase loans below the conforming size limit for the MSA and year in which the census tract is located.
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VI.
Estimation Results
Overview
This section presents estimates of the impact of GSE loan purchases on private sector purchases of mortgages in the secondary market. The estimating equation is as described in (4.10). In all cases, we present ordinary least squares (OLS) and GMM estimates for each sample year. The OLS estimates are in Panel A of Table 2 while the GMM model estimates are in Panel B. In both panels, each column corresponds to a different sample year.
It is important to recognize that for all models the standard errors are clustered at the county level. In addition, all models include controls for county fixed effects, tract-level loan and borrower attributes, as well as 17 tract-level indicators of the socioeconomic status of the resident population.
Loan and borrower attributes are obtained from HMDA and include the ratio of tract median borrower income to median loan amount, median loan amount, median borrower income, percent of borrowers that are minority (Hispanic or African American), and percent of borrowers that are female. Tract socioeconomic indicators of the resident population include the income distribution of the tract (25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles), unemployment rate, welfare rate, poverty rate, percentage of families that are female headed with children, percentage population that is Hispanic, percentage African American, average age, percentage of adults that are male, percent of adults with a high school degree, percent with some college, and percent with college or more. Also included among the tract attributes are the average age of the housing stock, percent of stock that is single family, and population density of the tract. 21 We thank Glenn Canner of the Federal Reserve Board for assisting us in identifying the relevant conforming loan size limits.
To maintain focus on the impact of GSE purchases, Table 2 does not report the coefficients on the variables just described. Instead, only the coefficients on the GSE purchase/origination variables and diagnostic statistics are provided. For select years, complete results for the first and second-stage GMM regressions are provided in the Appendix for review.
OLS estimates of crowd out
We begin with the OLS estimates in Panel A. In viewing this panel, recall that a coefficient of 0 on the GSE purchase/origination ratio indicates the complete absence of GSE crowd out of private sector loan purchases, whereas a coefficient of -1 implies complete crowd out. Reading across the columns from left to right, certain patterns are worth highlighting. Summarizing, the OLS estimates suggest that crowd out increased during the early part of the 1990s, leveled off in the middle years of our sample, increased sharply during the peak years of the housing boom in 2004 and 2005, and then disappeared with the crash in 2007. As will be apparent, the qualitative nature of this pattern is broadly similar to patterns in the GMM estimates.
GMM estimates of crowd out
Consider now the GMM estimates in Panel B. In discussing these results, we will first comment on the point estimates for GSE crowd out and compare those estimates to the OLS models in Panel A. In a later subsection, we discuss various diagnostic checks that shed light on the validity of the instruments and robustness of our estimates. For now, it is sufficient to note that we believe the various diagnostics as well as the conceptual arguments offered earlier support the validity of the instruments.
Reading from left to right in Panel B of Table 2 , the estimates suggest that in the early sample years, GSE purchase activity may have actually produced a small "crowd in" effect: In 1994, the coefficient on GSE Purchase/Origination ratios is positive 0.17 with a t-ratio of 1.04. Although imprecisely estimated, this point estimate is consistent with early arguments by Lang and Nakamura 
Selection effects and endogenous GSE activity
As noted above, the qualitative patterns of the OLS and GMM estimates across sample years in Table 2 are broadly similar: limited crowd out by the GSEs early in the 1990s, moderate crowd out in the mid-1990s to early 2000s, much higher crowd out during the peak years of the housing boom in the mid-2000s, and then absence of crowd out with the crash in 2007. While qualitatively similar, the precise patterns of coefficients over time do differ between the OLS and GMM models in Panels A and B. It is informative to look more closely at those differences.
We approach this comparison with the assumption that the GMM estimates are consistent.
Bearing that in mind, a more negative OLS estimate of GSE crowd out implies that the GSEs tend to purchase loans in census tracts with unusually limited private sector purchase activity, conditional on the extensive model controls. A more positive OLS estimate implies the reverse. Bearing this in mind, the OLS estimates of GSE crowd out are more negative than the GMM counterparts for 1994 through 1998. This is suggestive that during these years the GSEs tended to concentrate on census tracts that received unusually limited attention from private secondary market intermediaries given the observable features of the tracts. This could potentially be construed as consistent with GSE efforts to adhere to the spirit of their charters, which require the GSEs to do business in tracts that policy makers It is difficult to interpret precisely the differences between the OLS and GMM estimates. This is because the drivers of correlation between GSE purchase activity and unobserved factors imbedded in the OLS error term are, by definition, unobservable. However, two points are worth emphasizing here. First, once again we see that the estimated patterns differ with market conditions, and seemingly in a systematic fashion. Second, the difference in magnitude between the OLS and GMM estimates in some sample years highlights the importance of controlling for endogenous GSE activity. For that reason, the following subsection focuses on empirical evidence of the strength and validity of the instruments.
Robustness
Two considerations are paramount in assessing the robustness of our estimates given the IV research design. The first is whether the instruments are exogenous, and the second is whether the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous variable is sufficiently strong to avoid weak instrument bias (e.g. Murray (2006), Stock and Yogo (2005)). We consider both issues here. To facilitate, Table 3 presents three sets of GMM estimates of GSE crowd out for each sample year. The first set are those from Table 2 which were obtained using both tract underserved status and the tract ratio of borrower median income to AMI as instruments. The second set use only underserved status as an instrument, while the third use only tract ratio of borrower median income to AMI as an instrument. These three sets of estimates are presented in Panels A, B, and C, respectively, of Table 3 .
Note also that each of these panels reports the first-stage coefficients and t-ratios on the instruments as The instrument strength tests just discussed are mirrored in Panels B and C of Table 3 . In Panel B, the first-stage coefficient on underserved status is nearly identical to that reported in Panel A, and with nearly the same t-ratio, in every sample year. The same is true when comparing the first stage coefficient and t-ratio on tract borrower median income relative to AMI in Panel A versus Panel C. Our assessment of the strength of the individual instruments, therefore, is not sensitive to whether the instruments are included together in the first stage or entered separately.
Strong instruments are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the IV models to yield consistent estimates. The instruments must also be exogenous. Accordingly, Panel A also reports results from Hansen-J tests of the overidentifying restrictions. We caution that these tests are known to have weak power against the null that the model is correctly specified. Moreover, it should be emphasized that the tests for overidentication are only possible when there are more instruments than endogenous variables. In the years from 2003 onward, when tract borrower median income relative to AMI is insignificant in the first stage or nearly so, the Hansen-J test results are not credible and we ignore them for that reason. For the earlier years, the p-values on the Hansen-J test range from roughly 0.25 to 0.98 as one reads across the columns, consistent with the null that the instruments and the model are correctly specified. 24 An alternative approach to assessing instrument validity is to estimate the IV models separately with different groups of instruments. This strategy draws on the principle that two different groups of valid instruments should yield the same asymptotic estimates in the second stage. This strategy also requires that both sets of instruments be strongly correlated with the endogenous Broadly interpreted, a negative sign on tract underserved status and a positive sign on tract borrower median income relative to AMI is suggestive that the GSEs favor loan purchases in census tracts of higher relative economic standing (conditional on the model covariates). This echoes patterns evident in Figure 1 , where GSE purchase-origination ratios increase with neighborhood economic status. On the surface, this appears contrary to the intent of the GSE purchase goals discussed earlier. Recall, however, that the GSEs are subject to two quite different types of purchase goals: goals that target individual borrower income relative to AMI regardless of location (the borrower low-moderate and special affordable goals) and goals that target census tract median income relative to AMI regardless of borrower income (the underserved neighborhood goal). The former are the more prominent of the numeric goals in all years other than 1994 and 1995. In 1996, for example, the borrower low-moderate income goal was set at 40 percent of each GSE's loan purchases while the underserved neighborhood goal was set at 21 percent. 25 Because GSE loan purchases can count towards multiple goals, it seems likely that the borrower income goals are the more binding of the two (because many of the lower-income borrowers reside in underserved tracts). Under such circumstances, it would not be surprising for the GSEs to minimize further exposure to lower income neighborhoods in order to offset their increased exposure to credit risk stemming from the purchase of so many low-income loans. Such behavior would account for the negative sign on underserved tract status and the positive sign on tract borrower median income to AMI obtained in most sample years.
A further consideration is the change over sample years in magnitude of the first-stage instrument coefficients. Note that the HUD purchase requirements were ratcheted up sharply over the sample period, from 1994 to 2007. Indeed, by 2007, the low-moderate income goal was set at 55 percent of GSE loan purchases while the underserved neighborhood goal was set at 38 percent. As both goals become more stringent, it is likely that the GSEs would increasingly be forced to seek out loan purchases in lower income tracts. The evolution in the instrument coefficients described above matches that prediction.
Summarizing, both of our instruments are strong prior to 2003, but only tract underserved status is particularly strong thereafter. Hansen-J tests for the earlier years support the idea that our instruments are valid. Comparisons of IV models using separate instruments provide further support for the validity of the instruments. In addition, the temporal pattern on the first-stage instrument coefficients matches largely the ratcheting up of the GSE purchase goals that require the GSEs to do an increasing share of their business in lower income communities. Finally, the OLS and GMM estimates suggest a broadly similar qualitative pattern of crowd out effects over time.
VII. Conclusion
The housing government-sponsored enterprises ( Loan and borrower controls include the ratio of tract median loan amount to borrower median income, median loan amount, borrower median income, percent of borrowers that are minority (Hispanic or African American), and percent of borrowers that are female. The SES controls include the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of tract household income, unemployment rate, percent of individuals on welfare, poverty rate, percent of female headed households with children, the percent of the tract population that is Hispanic, percent African American, average age of the tract population, percent of adults that are male, percent of adults with high school degree, percent with some college, and percent with college or more, average age of the housing stock, percent of housing stock that is single family, and population density of the tract. Additional model controls include county fixed effects, census tract attributes of the loans and borrowers in each year as obtained from the HMDA files, and socioeconomic (SES) attributes of the tract population as obtained from the decennial census. For years prior to 2000, year-1990 SES controls are included in the model. For 2000 and later, year-2000 SES controls are used. Loan and borrower controls include the ratio of tract median loan amount to borrower median income, median loan amount, borrower median income, percent of borrowers that are minority (Hispanic or African American), and percent of borrowers that are female. The SES controls include the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of tract household income, unemployment rate, percent of individuals on welfare, poverty rate, percent of female headed households with children, the percent of the tract population that is Hispanic, percent African American, average age of the tract population, percent of adults that are male, percent of adults with high school degree, percent with some college, and percent with college or more, average age of the housing stock, percent of housing stock that is single family, and population density of the tract. 
